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THE OPTIONAL VALUE OF IS PROJECTS –
A STUDY OF AN IS PORTFOLIO
AT A MULTINATIONAL MANUFACTURER
Jim Kenneally and Yossi Lichtenstein*
University College Dublin
Jim@BoImail.com, Yossi.Lichtenstein@ucd.ie

ABSTRACT
The IS research literature has tested the applicability of option pricing models to IS projects mostly
through detailed case studies. The current study complements this literature by considering a wide set
of IS projects and assessing, albeit crudely, their optional value. We test the literature’s assumption
that IS projects embed significant optional value. Our research site is a European plant of a leading
multinational manufacturer of sophisticated products. The portfolio of current and recent IS projects
is studied through a questionnaire administered to all project managers. Seventeen project managers
were interviewed concerning thirty-one projects with median cost of $325k and median benefit of
$1.2m.
We find strong support to the prediction that IS projects include considerable optional value. The
thirty one projects we studied embed forty seven options, many of them with benefits comparable to
the value of the original projects. Only four projects had no optional value. A comparison between a
subset of the portfolio and the corresponding scale-up options shows that the exercise price of the
options is 20% of the original projects’ cost, and that the value of these options is about 70% of the
original projects’ value. This data also demonstrates the large return, of scale-up options – the
median return is 1500%, five fold the median return of projects.
The main practical implication of this study is that real option evaluation is useful for IS projects in
general, and should not be confined to special cases. A further implication is that real option thinking
may be of particular value in recognising reduction and deferral options. The project managers in
our study found such options difficult to identify and considered their time to expiration as relatively
short. Proactive management of reduction and deferral options should thus increase the flexibility
and value of IS projects.

1. INTRODUCTION
Careful evaluation of IS investment is of particular importance nowadays after a period characterised
by over-investment. The application of option pricing models to IS projects has been advocated for a
number of reasons, including the inherent flexibility in such projects [Kumar, 1997], the infrastructure
development and wait-and-see deployment-opportunities typical of many projects [Benaroch and
Kauffman, 1999] [Taudes et al., 2000], the strategic value of IS investment [Benaroch and Kauffman,
1999], and the fact that opportunities in the digital economy are not obvious and by the time they
become apparent, the window for investment has closed [Kulatilaka and Venkatraman, 1999].
Indeed, the applicability of option pricing models to IS projects has been discussed and tested in the
research literature. The empirical tests consist of case studies, each illustrating a specific evaluation
technique. These include a calculation of the optimal timing for deploying a point-of-sale debit
*
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services network [Benaroch and Kauffman, 1999 and 2000], an evaluation of an upgrade for a SAP
package at a car parts manufacturer [Taudes, 1998] [Taudes et al., 2000], and an analysis of a twostage investment in an imaging system by a mortgage bank [Kulatilaka et al., 2000].
The current study aims to complement this literature by considering a wide set of IS projects and by
assessing, albeit crudely, their optional value. Our aim is to test the prediction (or assumption) of the
literature that IS projects embed significant optional value. Although this prediction is intuitively
appealing, it has not been tested empirically. We have studied 31 projects at a multinational
manufacturer through structured interviews with all of its IS project managers. These respondents
identified 47 options, many of them with benefits comparable to the value of the original projects. We
have found that project managers more readily identify scale-up options over reduction and deferral
options and that the exercise time for the later is relatively short. A strong correlation between scaleup cost, benefit and timing and the parameters of the original projects have been found; however, no
correlation with uncertainty score has been measured.
This paper continues in Section 2 with a brief and abstract introduction to real options. Section 3
describes the research method and instruments and Section 4 depict the project portfolio. The main
findings, the options, are presented in three sub-sections: scale-ups (§5.1), reductions (§5.2), and
deferrals (§5.3). Section 6 is an analysis and discussion, and a brief conclusions-section ends the
paper.

2. REAL OPTIONS
The concept of real options is based upon the fact that managers have the flexibility to alter decisions
as further information becomes available. If conditions are favourable, a project may be expanded to
take advantage of these conditions. On the other hand, if circumstances become unfavourable, a
project may be curtailed or even cancelled as the conditions warrant. These discretionary actions can
be referred to as real options, made available to the management as part of a project, and allow to
expand or contract investment according to changing environmental conditions [Brealey and Myers,
2000].
Traditional investment appraisal techniques, such as net present value, have been criticised because of
their inadequacy in modelling uncertainty and management flexibility. A negative net present value of
a project is usually taken as a signal that the investment should not take place. However, that same
investment could still generate valuable options, which in favourable circumstances could make the
initial investment worthwhile.
Real option evaluation corrects this deficiency by using financial option pricing to evaluate investment
under uncertainty. Financial options refer to the right, but not the obligation, to buy or sell a financial
asset at a predetermined exercise price on, or before, a given expiration date. Pricing models of such
options use the ability to trade and replicate assets and assumptions of risk neutrality and known
probability distributions to derive pricing formulae. For example, the Black-Scholes formula shows
that the value of an option to buy a stock is positively related to the price of the stock itself, the time
before the option expires, the standard deviation per period of the rate of return on the stock, and the
risk free interest rate; the option value is negatively related to the exercise price.
There is a large body of literature about the application of option pricing to project evaluation,
including an annual international conference (see: realoptions.org). Most work to-date is in the oil and
mining industries and both the large consulting firms and specialist consultancies (ROgroup.com, realoptions.com) promote this method. A recent panel at ICIS concluded that although assumptions of
option pricing are mostly untrue for IS projects, the insights gained from using these methods are
useful [Kauffman et al., 2001].
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3. METHOD
The current study considers a wide set of IS projects and assesses their optional value. Our aim is to
complement the existing literature that evaluates single projects and to test the prediction that IS
projects embed significant optional value. In order to prevent bias in the selection of projects, we
study a complete portfolio at a single research site. However, we limit our investigation to the
optional value of each project separately, and do not consider either the interaction between projects or
a detailed portfolio risk profile [McFarlan, 1981].
Our research site is a European plant of a leading multinational manufacturer of sophisticated
products; we denote this plant by ‘Déan’, which is the Irish word for ‘to make’. The portfolio of
current and recent IS projects within Déan has been studied through a questionnaire administered to all
Déan’s project managers. Our initial plan to delineate the portfolio by the annual budgetary
documents failed, as there are no central lists of projects within Déan. Instead, we were given access
to all software development project managers, and we asked each to identify his or her three most
recent projects. These included any project from initial concept investigation to fully implemented
ones. Interviews were conducted face to face and typically lasted thirty minutes per project; in most
cases we had an introductory interview, which covered one project, and a secondary interview, after a
few days, to cover the additional one or two projects.
The study of a wide set of projects necessitated a simple and short questionnaire. We chose as our
guiding perspective the option application chapter of Brealey and Myers [2000], because of its
simplicity and clarity. The chapter classifies three common and important real options found in capital
investment projects:
x An expansion, or scale-up, is the option to make a follow-on investments if the immediate
investment project succeeds.
x A reduction, or scale-down, is the option to abandon planned investments in a project.
x A deferral is the option to wait and learn before investing.
The chapter discusses the cost, benefits and timing of options, and the volatility of the underlying
assets – we used these simple issues to form our questionnaire. Because of the difficulties in assessing
future costs and benefits, we allowed answers in terms relative to the original project parameters. In
particular, we asked whether the costs and benefits of the option are much smaller, smaller, similar,
larger, or much larger than the original costs and benefits. Furthermore, the conceptual and practical
difficulties in estimating volatility [Benaroch and Kauffman, 2000], convinced us to ask only for a
rough assessment of the overall degree of uncertainty. These compromises were possible because we
did not attempt on calculating the option value and we concentrated on the identification of options
and their basic parameters. An initial questionnaire was tested by two pilot interviews and was
discussed with the senior IT manager at Déan; the final research questionnaire is given in the
appendix.
We present the data about the 31 projects using qualitative and quantitative tables; we use frequency
tables to prevent the few large projects from distorting the analysis. When actual costs and benefits
are not known, the relative values are transformed into quantities by multiplying them with the
original project parameters. For example, when the benefits of a scale-up are related to the benefits of
the original project, much smaller benefits are considered as 20% of the original ones, smaller as 50%,
similar as equal to the original, larger as 200% and much larger as 1,000%.

4. THE PORTFOLIO
Seventeen project managers were interviewed about 31 projects, 14 of these projects were on-going
and 17 already completed. The newest project in the portfolio was in the definition phase and the
oldest project was completed 18 months before the interview. Although we interviewed 17 managers
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and asked for 3 recent projects from each, the final number of projects is smaller than expected,
mainly because larger projects involved several managers. The senior IT manager at Déan reviewed
this set of projects and confirmed that it was typical of Déan and involved all IT disciplines at the site.
Table 1, on the next page, presents the projects, sorted by cost; an item that is not available is marked
by N/A; k denotes thousands of dollars and m denotes millions of dollars.
Proj.
No.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31

Functionality

Duration
(months)
Automating fault logging for building facilities
4
Automated time-logging by automation engineers
7
Remote and central monitoring of servers
4
Logistical DSS – delivery scheduling
6
Human Resource DSS – employee turnover analysis
6
Report generation for production work-in-process;
12
used for passing information between shifts
Electronic purchasing for facilities materials
18
System integration of call centre support services;
4
will allow outsourcing
Marketing DSS – identifies and compensates
16
distributors who achieve sales targets
A depository of firm training resources; facilitates
12
internal training rather than external courses
Production floor quality testing; expected to increase
3
productivity
Logging service history of tooling machines; will aid
16
repair technicians
Office IT Infrastructure set-up; will allow marketing
7
tele-workers to work in a new location
Cost control application for project management
15
Data back up facility for laptops
4
Quality Control DSS –removes defective products
7
early during the production to save production costs
Knowledge management tool for corporate intranet
12
System integration with Déan’s IT infrastructure of a
8
newly acquired company 1
System integration with Déan’s IT infrastructure of a
16
newly acquired company 2
Network solution to capacity overload
12
Disaster recovery central system
12
Migrating legacy infrastructure to new non-propriety
32
IT infrastructure; will reduce support costs
Move to non proprietary database system
6
System integration with Déan’s IT infrastructure of a
6
newly acquired company 3
Software upgrade for production process tools
15
Worldwide firm Y2K system upgrade and audit
25
Integration of the production process tools
33
Marketing and sales office IT infrastructure
12
Increase processing capacity for shop floor systems
13
IT infrastructure for a new production floor
16
IT infrastructure for the next generation production
32

Cost
($)
3k
25k
25k
28k
30k
40k

Benefit
($)
40k
300k
300k
N/A
25k
1.8m

Uncertainty
(1-7)
2
4
3
7
4
6

50k
78k

75k
N/A

7
5

90k

190k

5

100k

1.2m

5

135k

2.3m

2

160k

1m

6

200k

200k

2

300k
300k
325k

300k
300k
30m

7
4
4

350k
390k

3.5m
N/A

7
6

500k

N/A

7

500k
800k
1.1m

22m
1.7m
3m

6
5
3

1.1m
1.5m

2.5m
3m

6
6

5m
10m
10.5m
13m
30m
60m
95m

1.2m
N/A
30m
20m
N/A
N/A
N/A

2
4
6.5
7
4
5
5.5

Table 1: Projects
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Porter’s [1985] value chain is utilised to demonstrate where our projects fall within Déan’s operations.
As can be seen from Figure 1, projects are spread throughout the value chain with a concentration in
Operations/Technology-Development; this seems reasonable for a manufacturing company.
Support
activities

Corporate
Infrastructure
Human
Resource
Management
Technology
Development
Procurement

9
1

2

3

8

1

2

3

Operations

Outbound
logistics

Sales and
Marketing

Service

2
Inbound
logistics
Primary
activities

Figure 1: Number of projects for value chain classes
Table 2 presents the project cost and benefit frequencies; for example, seven projects had costs below
$50K, three projects above $50K and below $100K, and so on. The benefits for eight projects are not
available, as project managers could not estimate them with confidence.
Projects
below this sum ($)
Cost
Benefit

50k

100k

1m

10m

100m

7
23%
2
9%

3
10%
1
4%

11
35%
7
30%

5
16%
8
35%

5
16%
5
22%

Table 2: Cost/Benefit frequencies

The cost of most projects is between $100k and $1m and five are ‘mega-projects’ with costs above
$10m. The frequency of high benefit is relatively higher (57% above $1m) than the frequency high
cost (32%). Indeed, the median project cost is $325k and the median project benefit is $1.2m;
similarly, the median return – benefit on cost - for the 23 projects with both cost and benefit data is
290%. Managers were asked for their agreement with the statement that “the overall degree of
uncertainty in this project is much higher than in Déan’s typical IS projects”. The answers were on a
Likert scale from with 1 - strongly disagree, 2 – disagree, 3 – somewhat disagree 4 – neutral, 5 –
somewhat agree, 6 – agree, and 7 - strongly agree. The frequencies of responses are presented in
Table 3. The median value is 5 (some agreement) which we interpret as consistent with Déan’s
culture of risk taking in order to be first to market.
Uncertainty
Number of
Projects

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

0

4

2

6

5

7

7

Table 3: Frequency of project uncertainty
There is no significant correlation between the project uncertainty scores and other project parameters.
We tried to further assess the underlying volatility of the projects by asking the project managers for
either a market sector or a publicly traded company that are similar to the project. Only for eight of
the projects managers were able to identify a sector or company which fits well the project; for
example, a specific production tooling company. For most projects, the sector or company suggested
did not fit well the project; for example, the software services sector and SAP were mentioned for
several projects.
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5. THE OPTIONS
Most projects, twenty-seven in number, included options, typically either one or two options per
project. Only four projects had no options – these are projects 4, 7, 8, and 20; three of these are
relatively small with cost below $100k. The frequency of embedded options in the portfolio is
represented in Table 4; the next sub-sections describe the three classes of options in some detail.
Number of options
per project
Number of Projects

0

1

2

3

4

4
12
14
Table 4: Frequency of options

1

1

4.1. Scale-Up
A scale-up option is defined as the ability to make any additional investment, which becomes
beneficial as a direct result of the initial project investment. Table 5, on the next page, presents data
about the 30 scale-up options: the first column gives the original project number, and the exercise time
column represents the time (after project start) when the scale-up could have been exercised until.
The table is sorted by the option cost. However, the column of the original project numbers
(representing their cost ranking in the portfolio) is also in ascending order demonstrating the
correlation between costs. Indeed, the scale-up cost is correlated with the project cost (r=0.95; p<1%),
the scale-up benefit is correlated with the project benefit (r=0.48; p<1%), and the exercise time is
correlated with the project duration (r=0.60; p<1%). Cross correlations (project-cost/scale-up benefit,
etc.) are also positive and significant; there is no significant correlation between the project risk scores
and the scale up parameters. The reasons for the scale-up options are presented in Table 6. They
include new functionality, addition of capacity, users, departments, and sites, and commercialisation
of a project.
Reason
Additional functionality
Capacity expansion
Increase in the number of users
Application in more departments
Implementation in other sites
External sale of the project

Projects
1, 2 (twice), 9, 12, 16, 21, 23, 27
13, 18, 19, 24, 29, 30, 31
2 (twice), 10
3, 9, 14, 21, 22, 26, 27
5, 6, 11, 12, 15, 28
17
Table 6: Scale-up reasons

Number of options
9
7
3
7
6
1

Table 7 presents the frequencies of scale-ups by cost and benefit; data about the benefit of six scale-ups is not
available.

Number of options
below this sum ($)
Scale-up Cost

50k

100k

1m

10m

11
2
10
6
37%
7%
33%
20%
1
2
10
6
Scale-up Benefit
4%
8%
42%
25%
Table 7: Scale-up cost/benefit frequencies

100m
1
3%
5
21%
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Proj
No.
1
2
2
3
5
6
9
9
10
11
12
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
21
21
22
23
24
26
27
28
29
30
31

Option functionality

Exercise
Time
(months)
Replace administration personnel with additional
5
functionality to the fault logging system
Expand functionality of the time tracking system; will
12
allow to add new users
Yet more functionality and users to the time tracking
10
system
Monitor additional departmental servers by the remote
24
monitoring system
Install the employee turnover DSS in other sites
16
Install the work-in-process reporting in other
24
manufacturing sites
Analyse the data collected by the distributor target12
achievement system
Addition of marketing channel programs to the
12
distributor target-achievement system
Add users to the depository of internal training
3.5
resources
Install the production floor quality testing system in
4
additional sites
Install the service history logging system in additional
16
sites
Capture more information about certain tooling
16
processes into the logging of service history
Expand capacity of the office IT infrastructure
12
Add departments as users of the project cost control
4
system
Install the laptop backup system in other sites
8
Capture more information about certain tooling
16
processes; will allow better quality control
Sell externally the intranet knowledge management tool
14
Add IT infrastructure to the newly integrated WAN
8
Add IT infrastructure to the newly integrated WAN
15
Add data archiving to the disaster recovery system
12
Add departments to the disaster recovery system
24
Migrate more legacy databases to the new non24
propriety system
Add DSS capability to the non-proprietary database
4
Add IT infrastructure to the newly integrated WAN
5
Upgrade additional systems as part of the 2000
6
compatible upgrade and audit
Expand functionality and deploy in another part of the
36
production process
Install the marketing and sale IT infrastructure in other
9
sites
Further processing capacity increase in the shop floor
24
systems
Increase processing capacity of the new production
28
floor
Increase processing capacity of the next generation
24
production floor

Cost

Benefit

($)
8k

($)
80k

10k

750k

12.5k

675k

25k

3m

19k
40k

250k
1.8m

4k

95k

4.5k

190k

10k

2.4m

20k

2.3m

32k

10m

80k

500k

400k
150k

400k
300k

600k
325k

600k
30k

2m
78k
250k
160k
200k
220k

100m
N/A
N/A
875k
3.5m
50k

150k
187k
2m

40m
600k
N/A

5m

65m

5m

40m

7m

N/A

6m

N/A

19m

N/A

Table 5: Scale-ups
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The scale-ups cost is lower than the original projects – 37% of them are below $50K. The frequency
of high benefit is higher (46% above $1m). Stated differently, the median scale-up cost is $155k, and
the median scale-up benefit is $713k. The median values for the original projects are – cost $325,
benefit $1.2m. When returns, benefit on cost, are calculated for the 24 scale-ups with both cost and
benefit data, the median value is 1500%; the median return for the original projects is 290%. It seems
that scale-up options are able to leverage the original investment making them very attractive.

4.2. Reductions
A reduction option is defined as the ability to scale down the initial investment or abandon planned
investments, should conditions prove unfavourable. Twelve projects were identified as having
reduction options. The ability to execute reductions expires relatively early in the project duration
when compared to scale-ups. Table 8 presents the data about reductions; data about the cost of one
option is unavailable and data about the benefit reduction of one option is not included. Table 9
presents the relevant frequencies.
Proj.
No.

Reduction description

Exercise
time
(months)
4

Cost
savings
($)
N/A

Benefit
reduction
($)
9k

2

20k

240k

1

100k

100k

4

75k

240k

14

2m

100m

4

300k

800k

3

100k

2

525k

100k
extra benefit
750k

1

250k

3.6m

27 Reduce functionality of the process tools

12

5m

20m

28 Reduce marketing office IT infrastructure to ‘must
haves’
31 Reduce processing capacity of the next generation
production floor

6

3.5m

2m

12

9.5m

N/A

5

Reduce the employee turnover DSS functionality if
resources are needed elsewhere in the department
10 Keep the depository of training resources only at Déan
and not in other of the firm sites
13 Reduce capacity of the office IT infrastructure
14 Keep the project cost control system only at Déan and
not in other of the firm sites
17 Do not complete the knowledge management tool as a
commercial product
21 Limit functionality and scale of the disaster recovery
system
23 Reduce processing power of the non-proprietary
database
24 Eliminate duplicate systems between Déan and the
newly acquired company
25 Remove functionality of the software for process tools

Table 8: Reductions
Number of options
50k
100k
1m
10m
below this sum ($)
1
3
3
4
Cost savings
1
1
4
3
Benefit reduction
Table 9: Reduction frequencies

100m
0
2

Reasons for why a reduction could be necessary are both internal and external:
x External reasons offered by project managers were mainly change in market demand and legal
compliance.
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x Internal reasons related to internal political risk, budget over-run, technical risk, limited resources
and project management difficulties.
While the internal reasons are more varied, external reasons were cited for eight out of the twelve
reductions. This corresponds with Keil et al.’s [1998] observation regarding the significance of
uncontrollable external risk in IS projects. In comparison, the exercise time for reductions is relatively
short, with median of 4.0 months. The exercise time for the scale-up options has a median of 12.0
months, which is the same as the median project duration.

4.3. Deferrals
A deferral option is defined as the opportunity to postpone the original investment in the project in
order to wait and learn about the environmental conditions. Table 10 presents the five deferral options
identified.
Proj.
No.

Description

Exercise
Cost
Time
reduction
(months)
($)
14 Re-analyze and design the cost control system
4
22
21 Wait for stability of the technical standards for the
10
0
disaster recovery system
25 Wait for new release of the process tools software
6
2.5m
29 Wait for data about market demand before increasing
processing capacity for shop floor systems
30 Wait for the next generation of the relevant IT
infrastructure before investing in the new shop floor

Benefit
Increase
($)
0
0
0

6

6m

0

6

35m
extra cost

N/A

Table 9: Deferrals
All deferred projects were considered to be potentially beneficial because of the opportunity to reduce
investment costs during the deferral period. One project (number 30) would have increased its costs
as deferral meant waiting for the release of the next generation of a product. The exercise time for
deferrals is short with median of 6.0 months.
Deferral options were rejected by many project managers due to contractual obligations with vendors
and Déan’s culture of being first to market; some managers reported that it is difficult to be critical of
your own project. Where deferral options existed, they were primarily viewed as an opportunity to
reduce project cost during the deferral period.

6. ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION
We have found strong support to the assumption, or prediction, that IS projects include considerable
optional value.
The 31 projects we studied included 47 options, many of them with benefits
comparable to the value of the original projects. Only four projects had no optional value. A full
comparison between portfolio value and optional value is not possible because we do not have detailed
enough data for option value calculation. However, comparisons are possible between projects and
scale-up options because their costs and benefits are conceptually similar. In particular, the portfolio
total cost is about $245m, the total cost, or exercise price, of the scale-up options is $50m, or about
20% of the portfolio cost. For the 20 projects where data about benefits (for both project and scale
ups) is available, the total benefit is about $96m; the total benefit of the scale-up options for these
projects is about $68m, or 70% of the original benefit. These simple comparisons demonstrate that not
only there are many options, but their costs and values are considerable. This data also demonstrates
the large return, benefit on cost, of scale-up options – the median return for scale-ups is 1500%, five
fold of the median return for projects.
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The reasons for the existence of options in information systems, as described in the literature, are
indeed relevant in our portfolio:
x The inherent flexibility in such projects [Kumar, 1997]: nine scale-ups consist of additional
functionality and six reductions consist of not developing some functionality.
x The infrastructure development and wait-and-see deployment-opportunities typical of many
projects [Benaroch and Kauffman, 1999] [Taudes et al., 2000]: twenty-three scale-up options
consisted of addition of capacity, users, departments, or sites. Several of these were related to IT
infrastructure.
x The strategic value of IS investment [Benaroch and Kauffman, 1999]: many of the expansions
allow relatively fast and inexpensive scale-up of production capacity that is of strategic
importance for the multinational manufacturer. Similarly, some of the reductions and deferrals
allow fast scale-down in production capacity.
x Opportunities in the digital economy are not obvious and by the time they become apparent, the
window for investment has closed [Kulatilaka and Venkatraman, 1999]: one option consisted of
commercialisation of a project into a software package.
An additional finding is that project managers more readily identified scale-up options over reduction
and deferral. The exercise time for reductions and deferrals was relatively short. This may be a
general phenomenon related to the flexibility and infrastructural nature of IS. However, the
characteristics of our research site may have enhanced it: Déan is a large multinational manufacturer
that regularly transfers successful systems to additional sites and has a culture of gradual improvement
in productivity. Also, for the time span of many of the projects in the portfolio, Déan operated in a
growing market and emphasised new products, growth in production capacity, and aggressive IS
investment. A third reason for the relative lack of reductions and deferrals is project managers’ bias.
Many respondents remarked that it is difficult to be the ‘devil’s advocate’ for a project that you are
meant to be the champion of.
Another finding is the strong correlation between scale-up cost, benefit and timing and the parameters
of the original projects. However, we have not found correlation between option parameters and
project uncertainty. Do these results make sense? Theoretically, options are more valuable when their
exercise price is low, the value of the underlying asset is high, volatility is high, and the time horizon
is long. So, for example, the correlation between scale-up benefit and project benefit is expected.
However, it is unclear why there is no correlation between benefit and uncertainty score. One
explanation is that our uncertainty instrument is lacking: it includes only a single item, it is subjective,
and we have not distinguished explicitly between uncertainty and risk. Another possibility is that the
simple theoretical interpretation presented here may be inappropriate. Our portfolio consists of
internal projects with flexible boundaries which may reflect reaction to risk. So, for example, high
risk may result in a small initial investment and a negative correlation between project and option,
making our additional findings difficult to interpret.

7. CONCLUSION
This study has found a considerable number and value of options in an IS project portfolio at a
multinational manufacturer. This result supports the prediction of the real-options IS literature, and is
the first empirical evidence for the optional value of an IS project portfolio.
The main practical implication of this study is that real option evaluation is useful for IS projects in
general, and should not be confined to special cases. A further implication is that real option thinking
may be of particular value in recognising reduction and deferral options. The project managers in our
study found such options difficult to identify and considered their time to expiration to be relatively
short. Proactive management of reduction and deferral options should thus increase the flexibility and
value of IS projects.

249
ECIS 2002 • June 6–8, Gdańsk, Poland

— First — Previous — Next — Last — Contents —

Jim Kenneally, Yossi Lichtenstein

Our conclusions are limited by the scope of this study: a single portfolio at a large manufacturer
during a period of market growth. Although our original goal was to utilise a simple and short
questionnaire, we feel that our measurement instrument is too limited. In particular, the classification
of options, the reasons for exercising them, and data about uncertainty and risk are too limited. A
study of additional portfolios using a more elaborate questionnaire is called for. A further limitation is
the lack of analysis of interaction between projects; we feel that a careful definition of interacting
options and their empirical study should be attempted in future research.

REFERENCES
BENAROCH M. and R. KAUFFMAN (1999). A Case for Using Real Options Pricing
Analysis to Evaluate Information Technology Project Investment. Information Systems Research, 10(1), 70-86.
BENAROCH M. and R. KAUFFMAN (2000) Justifying Electronic Banking Network Scale-up Using Real
Options Analysis. MIS Quarterly, 24(2), 1957-225.
BREALEY R. and S. MYERS (2000). Principles of Corporate Finance. 6th Edition. McGraw-Hill.
KAUFFMAN R., H. LUCAS, P. TALLON, A. WHINSTON, and K. ZHU (2001) Panel Debate about Real
Options Analysis. 22nd International Conference on Information Systems (ICIS).
KEIL M., P. CULE, K. LYYTINEN, and R. SCHMIDT (1998). A framework for Identifying Software Project
Risks. Communication of The ACM, 41(11), 76-83.
KULATILAKA N. and N. VENKATRAMAN (1999). Real Options in the Digital Economy.
The Financial Times, September.
KULATILAKA N., P. BALASUBRAMANIAN and J. STORCK (1999). Using Real Options to Frame the IT
Investment Problem, in Trigeorgis Lenos, Editor, Real Options and Business Strategy: Applications to Decision
Making, Risk Books.
KUMAR R., (1999). Understanding DSS Value: An Options Perspective. Omega: The International Journal of
Management Science, 27(3), 295-304.
MCFARLAN F. W. (1981). Portfolio Approach to Information Systems. Harvard Business Review, 59(5), 142150.
PORTER, M. (1985). Competitive Advantage. New York, Free Press.
TAUDES A. (1998). Software Growth Options. Journal of MIS, 15(1), 165-185.
TAUDES A., M. FUERSTEIN and A. MILD (2000). Option Analysis of Software Platforms Decisions. MIS
Quarterly, 24(2).

APPENDIX: THE RESEARCH QUESTIONNAIRE (PART 2 - PROJECT OPTIONS)
The following questions investigate the potential options that may or may not have been enacted by
the company. Answer the questions without using the benefit of hindsight, namely, use the managerial
point of view at the time the project was started.
1. Describe briefly the possibilities to expand the project or to have continuation projects? Yes/No
a) How long after the initial project start date would such a scale-up have been possible and why
would it have been useful?
b) Roughly, how much would such a scale-up have cost?
OR
The costs from such a scale-up option in relation to the costs of the initial
project would have been: (Circle one)
Much
Much
Smaller (2)
Similar (3)
Larger (4)
Smaller (1)
Larger (5)
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c) Roughly, what would have been the quantifiable benefits of such a scale-up?
OR
The benefits from such a scale-up option in relation to the benefits of the
initial project would have been: (Circle one)
Much
Much
Smaller (2)
Similar (3)
Larger (4)
Smaller (1)
Larger (5)
d) What would have been the other benefits (if any) of such a scale-up option?
2. What would have been the possibilities to reduce (or scale down) the project? Yes/No
a) When, after the project start date, would have such a reduction been possible?
b) Why would a reduction have been necessary?
c) Roughly, how much could you have reduced the investment by?
OR
“The reduction in costs arising from the option to reduce the investment, as it related
to the initial project costs would have been.” (Circle one)
Very Small (1)
Small (2)
Half (3)
Large (4)
Very Large (5)
d) Roughly, what would be the drop in project value or benefits?
OR
“The benefits lost arising from the option to reduce the investment, as it related to the
initial project benefits would have been.” (Circle one)
Very Small (1)
Small (2)
Half (3)
Large (4)
Very Large (5)
3. What would have been the possibilities to defer the starting date of the project? Yes/No
a) For how long would it be possible to defer the project?
b) What would have been the quantifiable benefits been (value from learning of market conditions
or new technology, etc)?
OR
“The increase in benefits arising from the option to defer the investment, as it related
to the initial project benefits would have been.” (Circle one)
Very Small
Small
Similar
Large
Very Large
c) Roughly, would this deferral reduce project costs?
OR “The reduction in costs arising from the option to defer the investment, as it related to the
initial project costs would have been.” (Circle one)
Very Small (1)
Small (2)
Half (3)
Large (4)
Very Large (5)
4. What is the risk embedded in this project?
a) “The overall degree of uncertainty in this project is much higher than in our typical IS projects?”
Strongly

Somewhat

Somewhat

Strongly

Agree
Disagree Disagree Disagree Neutral
Agree
Agree
(2)
(4)
(6)
(1)
(3)
(5)
(7)
b) Would you know off-hand, of a market sector (or a company that is publicly traded), and similar
to this project in terms of its operations and business type?
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